

# Cultural heritage and identity politics



edited by:  
**Roel During**

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**ISBN: 978-94-6173-075-6**  
**e-ISBN: 978-94-6173-076-3**

**Layout and editing:**  
**Wageningen Academic Publishers**

**First published, 2011**

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**2011**

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# Acknowledgements

Two anonymous reviewers went over the texts and gave numerous suggestions on language, contents and profile. They deserve our greatest gratitude.

Rosalie van Dam and Martijn Duineveld, both working for Wageningen UR, organised the symposium and assisted to produce its proceedings. It is always a huge pleasure to work with them.

Many thanks must be expressed towards Rakefet Sela-Sheffy and Itamar Even-Zohar from the Tel-Aviv University in Israel for taking the trouble to travel to the Netherlands for this symposium. They contributed to an inspiring discussion with high quality scientific contributions.

Many thanks for Sjoerd During, who voluntarily wrote the short essay on Ibn Battuta in the margins of his study activities in anthropology. We hope in future to read much more of his excellent writings on Arabic scientists along the Silk Road.

This publication has been subsidized by the Knowledge Programme 'Transitions, Innovations and Behaviour', running at Wageningen UR.

*Roel During*, editor  
Alterra, Landscape Centre  
Silk Road Research Foundation



# *Preface*

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## **Heritage renaissance**

*Kristof Van Assche*

Heritage and identity are old concepts that are continuously revised, both academically and in social practice.

The scientific and policy discourses on what heritage is and should be have multiplied over the last decades. These heritage discourses, rooted in the 18th century dialectics between romanticism and enlightenment, were revived and intensified by the growth of the tourist industry, and thus linked to processes of commodification, but simultaneously associated with the enlargement and deepening of the European Union. Meanwhile, political discourse on identity intensified after the influx of immigrants in the latter 20th century, and the same process of Europeanization. One can argue that European identity discourse, as in the conscious reflection on scales of identity, is a product of the Renaissance, when various forms of reflection emerged, later re-labeled as 'science', and when Europe's map was a chequerboard of political entities that was in constant motion.

Renaissance Europe saw the emergence of nation-states, and a concurrent stream of state-sponsored reflection on national identity. Macchiavelli, writing about Florence in a time of perceived decay, returns to the issue of identity over and over again, under different names, but usually linked to the question of state survival. Cities and larger states need an identity, he argues, but certain identities are bound to generate more strategic and adaptive possibilities than others in a given time and place. And identities need to be plural. Cities have a 'character', just as people, but they also harbor families, factions, personalities, corrupting rich people, and they experience fashions, ups and downs. Unity and plurality recur at various points in his analyses of political success, and are thus at the heart of early European reflection on community. Conflicts and differences are needed, and ought to become visible, in order to harness the best resources in the state to adjust



to ever changing circumstances. But difference can also undermine, if the institutions are destabilized rather than transformed through it.

Renaissance Europe was also a place of re- discovery of the past, of the Roman and Greek past. Early tourism was already heritage tourism, since much was focused on visiting ruins and early digs. But the Romans of the Renaissance are not the Romans of the EU or the Romans of current heritage tourism (let alone the people living in 21st century Rome) The Romans of 16th century humanism were awe- inspiring, father- figures that were alien and distant still. Christian sensibilities and lingering loyalties to often petty worldly regimes interfered with a deep admiration for a civilization deemed far superior. Thus an intensity and ambiguity perfused the experience of heritage that could be highly unsettling. The Romans made people question everything and everyone, including themselves.

If Europe is really working on its Renaissance, with the Roman empire as a silent point of reference, and if the revivals of both heritage and identity discourse are part of this new Renaissance, then both the Roman empire and its reinterpretation and experience during the first Renaissance can teach us a few things.

As the authors in this fascinating volume point out, both heritage and identity discourse can be instrumentalized, by proponents and opponents of European integration, as they can be commodified, in branding efforts with various implementations. Just as in Macchiavelli's Europe, political and economic alliances shift, people get tired of things, are anxious, and in a tumultuous present they tend either to cling furiously to old (reinvented) identities or to redefine themselves on a regular basis. The past, and thus heritage, plays different roles at different times in these processes. In Renaissance culture, the Romans inspired a unity of thought we now label 'Renaissance' but in the politics and identity politics of the day, the effects were much more intricately patterned. French law became modeled on Roman law, and a Roman- inspired legal profession and administrative ethics arose that gradually permeated French society, but Spain and Italy itself proved quite different.

Roman politics was dominated by a Papacy that also claimed authority based on the past, but the glories of antiquity had a very different character for the Papal states. The Romans killed Christ, their teachings are heretic or irrelevant, their unity and plurality often not compatible with the notion of a

Christian state. Their vision of the time of Jesus did not inspire political and cultural change, but served as an anchor for present views.

From different theoretical perspectives, and in very different case studies, the authors in this volume all assert the importance of the linkages between heritage, identity and political transformation. With great acuity, they distinguish between the roles of heritage and identity discourse in everyday life, in politics, the legal system, and in science. Scientific reflection, such as this volume, can only contribute to public debate if it confronts the actors with this fluidity and complexity of identity construction and the uses of heritage. Whatever scientists say can and will be used against them, will be turned upside down and twisted and bent often times, in political, cultural and legal games, but that does not devalue this line of work at all. Scientific observations will be turned into ammunition, but that is no reason to stop observing. As long as people are confronted with the variety of identity constructions over time and place, political and cultural conversations have access to this diversity, thereby diminishing the chance of hardening of distinctions and simplification of reasoning.



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# Chapter 1.

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## **Ibn Battuta: about the Islamic and Arabic foundation and contribution to present-day modern science**

*Sjoerd During*

One might wonder, why is the name of a medieval Moroccan scientist, **Ibn Battuta**, the title of a scientific conference on identity and identity politics held in a Western European scientific institute? In this article I'll briefly explain the importance of Islamic sciences from the medieval period for today's modern western sciences. This will help us to understand **Ibn Battuta** in its context of medieval Islamic sciences.

The medieval era is often described as the dark ages, because of widespread poverty, diseases and most of all, because of a lack of development. The title dark ages might fit for most parts of Europe, but in contradiction the south and east of Europe knew a blooming civilization rapidly expanding and developing. The Islamic civilization, driven by the message of the new prophet Muhammad, quickly expanded to all corners of the by then known world. This expanding empire connected most parts of the world, resulting in a tremendous flow of migration, trade and development.

With the rise of the new Islamic empire other empires found their demise. Empires like the Byzantine and Persian left behind a great deal of knowledge gathered over centuries. There was a great demand for this knowledge by the Arab rulers because these traders had little experience in ruling the world. The great need for practical knowledge in booming cities like Baghdad and Damascus led to a quest of gathering, translating and developing the knowledge of the pre-Islamic world. A splendid example of this quest is '*Bayt al-Hikmah*' the house of knowledge in Baghdad. Founded in the 9<sup>th</sup> century by the Khalif, the Islamic leader, its object was to gather the world's best scholars and gather and develop as much knowledge as possible. Many

influential scholars studied in this house of wisdom, like al-Khawarizmi who is still famous for his book *al-Jabr* from which the notion algebra stems.

Another important center for learning was Islamic Iberia, al-Andalus. Al-Andalus is often remembered for its coexistence between the three major religions. Muslims, Christians and Jews lived and worked side by side resulting in a great deal of inventions often forgotten by many of today's scholars. In al-Andalus operated the first surgeons and for the first time astronomers rejected the geocentric Ptolemaic model of the universe and discovered the earth's orbit. These discoveries enabled Columbus to sail towards the new world.

After the fall of al-Andalus the Iberian Peninsula returned into Christian hands. Soon the new kings would end the co-operation of the major religions and ban both Jews and Muslims. Their scientific heritage on the other hand was welcome to stay and a new translation and development wave started. This time scientific works in Arabic were translated into Latin, forming the basis of modern western sciences. Similar events took place in Italy where Arabic work would be translated. The institutions of this translation movement would form the basis of Europe's first universities.

The French psychologist and sociologist Gustave Le Bon (1841-1931) said: 'The from Arabic translated documents, especially the scientific books, remained the sole source of gaining knowledge in the European universities during five or six centuries. And we can say that the Arabian influence in some disciplines, like medicine, remains until today. The works of Ibn Sina were still being taught in Montpellier in the last century.'

The Islamic religion has had great importance in and for this great quest for knowledge gathering and development.

The first word of the holy Quran revealed to the Prophet was the word 'Read' (96:1), Islamic scholars therefore often name the Islamic civilization the civilization of 'Read'. There are many locations in the Quran and in the sayings of the Prophet which encourage its followers to study and obtain knowledge. 'Say (O Muhammad): are those who know equal with those who know not? But only men of understanding will pay heed.' (39:9). It was because of this encouraging that immediately after the passing away of the Prophet a new scientific tradition emerged wherein scholars would abandon worldly pleasures and often travel great distances in able to study the Islamic

religion. It is said that the Famous gatherer of sayings of the Prophet, the Imam al-Bukhari had traveled the distance of a month on his camel to reach a man who he believed to know a saying unknown to himself. When he finally arrived he saw this man luring his horse with an empty sack, from this deceive Imam al-Bukhari knew he couldn't be trusted and immediately returned back home.

Knowledge and scholars have a greater position in Islam then leadership and leaders. It is therefore that great scholars in past times and even in today's time are welcomed with more respect and crowd than modern superstars or famous football players. Imam al-Jawzi (who died in 1201) wrote in his book 'Sayd al-Khatir' that sometimes his classes would be visited by no more than one hundred thousand students. It is also said that the famous Khalif Haron Rashid (766-809) once made pilgrimage and in the holy city of medina crowds would ignore him and storm to the great Islamic scholar Imam Malik (711-795).

These are just a few examples which show us how the first generations of Muslims valued knowledge and its people. It is their tradition which laid the basis for the great medieval scientific quest of the House of Wisdom in Baghdad and the later Andalusian quest in cities as Cordoba, Seville and Granada.

Where in this often forgotten part of history fits the man of our title, Ibn Battuta? Ibn Battuta was one of the medieval Muslim scholars, famous for his many travels around the world en the stories he left in his books. I'll shortly introduce you to this scholar by briefly summarizing his life.

Ibn Battuta was as stated earlier a Moroccan scholar, specialized in Islamic law, born in the city of Tangier in the year 703 after hijra (1304 for the western calendar). At the age of twenty one he would decide to make a pilgrimage to the holy lands of haram, the land of Mecca and Medina. This pilgrimage would be the beginning of his many travels all across the Islamic empire which reached from Spain to China and Indonesia. He would travel to Egypt, Greater Syria, the Arabian Peninsula including Yemen, Persia, India, China, Indonesia, Russia and the heartlands of Africa. In these travels he would encounter many oddities and different cultures and cultural practices, of which he would keep note and later on write his famous books about.



His travels and their stories is what Ibn Battuta is famous for. He has had influence in the disciplines of geography, history and also worthy of mentioning: anthropology, although this discipline didn't officially exist. The books of ibn Battuta are still read today and overall found quite interesting, informative and also amusing. Maybe it's flavor of amusement keeps him in remembrance, while other important scholars have been forgotten.

To wrap up: while Europe remained for ages in a status quo with poverty and underdevelopment, the Islamic civilization bloomed and created the basis for the later European scientific tradition to begin. Religion played an important role in this blooming Islamic civilization. It were the first Muslim scholars who created the norm and reference for later development. Ibn Battuta was one of them, and he lives on for ever, not only in conferences that carry his name With his legacy other histories emerge, other stories pop up new names are written. His books are on the [www](http://www). READ and civilize.

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# Chapter 2.

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## European heritage discourses, a matter of identity construction?

*Roel During*

### 2.1 Introduction

The words are familiar to us: Dutch cultural heritage, world heritage and European heritage. But what do they exactly mean? Some believe that European heritage is a specified category of world heritage, others consider it a special category of supra national heritage (Karnooch, 2001; Bugge, 2003). Can then a windmill be both Dutch and European heritage? Is a world heritage site within Europe automatically European heritage? Why do we have these blurring categories? These questions arise when considering the geographical and territorial conceptions of heritage and their cultural and political embeddings. These relations are rather complex, because some sites are meant to unify people in general (world heritage) and other categories are used to designate a nation, a community, an ethnic group or whatsoever (e.g. Dutch heritage). The latter category indicates differences or may even exaggerate oppositions when based on stereotyping. In this way it differs fundamentally from a category such as world heritage, representing universal values. World heritage is primarily meant to unite people by stashing peculiarities in the realm of history, worth to visit as a universal cosmopolitan tourist. Unification and separation are intertwined in signification processes produced in the realm of culture and politics. Cultural heritage as a special category of cultural values is produced by communities and reproduced in politics (Barnett, 2001; Lammy, 2006). In politics it is used to make the point of homogeneity and heterogeneity in different images of society (Amin, 2004). Some stress the complex nature of society and presuppose value pluralism as a fact of life (Berlin, 2002; Ashworth, Graham *et al.*, 2007). Others believe in certain universal values in society that serves as a basis for intercultural understanding and

stability (Raz, 2003; Leonardi, 2006).<sup>1</sup> These contradicting views on value pluralism and value monism both are substantiated by referring to cultural heritage and stress its contribution to unification or its expression of cultural diversity. The opposition produces competing concepts of citizenship and identity, as citizenship focuses on value consensus which is again based on value monism, whereas the concept of identity lodges pluralist views on societal values (Graves-Brown *et al.*, 1996; Tsaliki, 2007). Cultural heritage addresses issues of both pluralism and universalism and to understand these issues we need to explore the production of cultural heritage values and its relation to the politics of identity construction. It is this politics of identity construction that uses cultural heritage to mark differences or affiliations with other communities. 'United in diversity', Europe's motto, has strong implications for the way politicians frame culture and its legacies we call cultural heritage.

Further exploration of the relations of identity politics and cultural heritage values will be done by describing the organisational settings of cultural heritage in Europe, followed by a concise overview of treaties and recommendations. This overview is needed to shed a light on a long lasting dispute in European heritage discourses that involves different views on the value of cultural heritage for the European society. For an extensive overview of cultural heritage policies and their ideological grounds, see During, 2010. Here we focus on identity as a leading concept to express this value. The idea of managing and creating identities is briefly discussed by means of different models, grounding different ideological and political viewpoints. These models are used to make the final point in this article: the limits of zero sum identity thinking and the consequences of acknowledging value pluralism and identity pluralism for cultural heritage.

## 2.2 European cultural heritage discourses

Hundreds of organisations are contributing to the European cultural heritage discourses and most of them are highly specialised or operating on a national scale.<sup>2</sup> A simple overview of political and geographical overview is given

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<sup>1</sup> Such as respecting the lives of other people, or the believe in the same god although in different religions. The idea of equality between people is based on value monism.

<sup>2</sup> See the links on Europa Nostra: [www.europanostra.org](http://www.europanostra.org), such as for Industrial and Technical Heritage, Natural heritage, Village and Small Town heritage, European Maritime Heritage, Cultural Heritage without Borders.

in Table 1. These organisations produce regulations, organise symposia and lobby for restoration funds.

The official Treaties that require ratification and signing of the countries constituting the EU are accompanied by a great number of Declarations and Recommendations. A brief selection of them is given in Table 2, indicating the formal and informal discourses, produced in the interaction of governments and NGO's at national and international levels.

Treaties and declarations can be interpreted as forms of governance that try to establish consensus on good stewardship and good practices. This focus on consensus building is influenced by the dialectic relation of European ideology and national interests. There is a trend towards intangible cultural heritage categories, expressing concerns about safeguarding cultural diversity. It also shows a broadening of interests beyond the traditional fields of monuments and archaeology. This trend contradicts the ideologies of the Venice Charter and the Faro Convention. The Venice Charter expresses the view of the NGO's that governments have the obligation to take care of cultural heritage for future generations<sup>3</sup>. They are held responsible for the cultural heritage of a political entity. In practice this Venice Charter can be seen as a framework

**Table 1.** Cultural heritage organisations on different political and geographical scales.

	Governmental	Non-governmental
World	UNESCO	ICOMOS
Europe	Council of Europe: (CDPATEP) (HEREIN)	Europa Nostra
Nation	National Agencies for Cultural Heritage	National NGO's, expressing the interests of monument owners, organisers of festivals, and lovers of old stuff
Region		Regional NGO's, often related to city and countryside promotion

<sup>3</sup> [http://www.icomos.org/venice\\_charter.html](http://www.icomos.org/venice_charter.html).

**Table 2.** Some treaties, declarations and recommendations produces in the European cultural heritage discourse (During 2010).

Treaties	Declarations and recommendations
UNESCO World Heritage Convention 1972	ICOMOS Venice Charter, 1964
COE: European Cultural Convention 1954	UNESCO Recommendation on the
COE: Convention of Valetta, 1992	Safeguarding of Traditional Culture and
COE: Convention of Faro, 2005	Folklore 1989
COE: Landscape Convention 2005	UNESCO Declaration on the Responsibilities
	of the Present Generations towards
	Future Generations 1997
	UNESCO Declaration on Cultural Diversity
	2001
	UNESCO Convention on Safeguarding of
	the Intangible Cultural Heritage, 2003
	EC: European Heritage Label, 2004

for a wider lobby for restoration in the past decennia. Recently the Faro Convention focuses on the value of cultural heritage for society and in doing this it discriminates between European intellectual heritage and European monumental heritage.<sup>4</sup> This convention frames cultural heritage as the agreed set of social values, rooted in history, on how society should operate. It stresses the function of cultural heritage in its role as a collective memory of the people of Europe. The Faro Convention expresses the view of the Council of Europe. The dispute concentrates on the autonomy of the expert. The Faro Convention no longer sees the expert as the only person who should decide what is a monument and what isn't. The Council of Europe strives for a open inclusive cultural heritage definition and approach.

A closer look on the Faro definition of cultural heritage may help to clarify the ideological fundaments of the dispute. Cultural heritage is defined as 'a group of resources inherited from the past which people identify, independently of ownership, as a reflection of their constant evolving values, beliefs, knowledge and traditions' (Council of Europe, 2005). This definition already relates heritage to identity as a preamble for its value for society. The definition of European Heritage is 'all forms of cultural heritage in Europe

<sup>4</sup> <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/199.htm>.

which together constitute a shared source of remembrance, understanding, identity, cohesion and creativity', and 'the ideals, principles and values, derived from the experience gained through progress and past conflicts, which foster the development of a peaceful and stable society, founded on respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law' (Council of Europe, 2005). In this definition a gleam of universalism emerges as cultural heritage is supposed to reflect the shared values and norms of European society. It is supposed to be inherent in good European citizenship and contribute to cross cultural understanding and stability. Implicitly the definition refers to the economic law of unique selling points when framing cultural heritage as a resource for societal development. This again could be interpreted as a pluralist view on cultural heritage, because every region and city in Europe fosters its own identity construction. The Faro understanding of cultural heritage is based on a territorial concept of culture and identity. The implications of this territoriality are discussed below.

### 2.3 The problem of zero sum identity and its underlying assumptions

Regarding the fact that politicians normally have a territorial conception of culture and identity, we can understand why the relationship between regional, national and European identities is often framed as a set of Matrushka's or as a layer cake (Figure 1). Ideas on specific identities that are the products of specific regional life conditions give rise to identity constructs in which the geographical peculiarities of region plays a significant role. This idea can be easily combined with notions of wider scale identities such as national and European in which citizenship with its shared norms and values



**Figure 1.** The Matrushka identity model.

are presupposed. The idea of a layer cake is widespread among European federalists (Risse, 2003) and the idea of a Matrushka is used by regional actors in European projects. Politicians believe that an increase in one identity layer necessarily causes a decrease of another layer. For example more European identity is supposed to cause a serious decline in national identity. This is called 'zero sum' identity thinking and it is supposed to be one of the major drawbacks of Europeanization (Risse, 2003). The Matrushka's seem to fit, but do they fit in case of 27 countries and their numerous regions? The idea of a layer cake or of a Matrushka seems to be rather simple to account for a complex society like Europe (Ashworth *et al.*, 2007). This can be explored by a further evaluation of the presupposed manageability of identity construction and their accountings for pluralism and universalism. This will be done by elaborating five distinct identity models.


These identity models are derived for the sake of this article from identity disputes and scientific research. They are designated with short names indicating their rationale.

The ***Cartesian Radar Plot Model*** (Figure 2) is based on an understanding of identity construction as a pure rational process that can be influenced by politicians and their branding activities (Hendriks, 2004). Political branding of course is inspired by commercial branding success stories. A nice example of this type of branding can be found in the Netherlands with the so called Green Heart of the Randstad, a planning concept created by policy experts who in vain expected it to be assimilated by its inhabitants during the past 50 years (Hidding, 1997). The model is indicated below.

The ***Contextual Identity Model*** (Figure 3) allows for social interaction as the primary process leading to a specific identity.

It is based on a Castells understanding of a network society. The model presupposes identities to develop interactively. One needs other peoples reactions and labels to develop one's own identity. Chosen identities depend on the networks people participate in (Borgt *et al.*, 1996). One can develop more than one identity. Clothing, haircut and other features (such as the white shoelaces) are supposed to play an important role. Identity creation is considered to be influenced by associations. This way of conceptualizing identity is widespread in marketing, trying to establish brands connected to positive associations. A strong example is the appeal to the American street culture by certain clothing brands.

## 2. European heritage discourses, a matter of identity construction?




**Figure 2.** The Cartesian Radar Plot Identity Model.



**Figure 3.** The Contextual Identity Model.




The **Narrative Identity Model** (Figure 4) considers identity construction as a flexible set of choices from an individual's biography that can be adjusted to a specific situation or conversation. It is supposed to be highly individualistic, accounting for a combination of strategic considerations and emotional choices made in every selection. Some examples illustrate its relationship with collective memory, when communities define themselves as the result of a sequence of (mostly atrocious) precedents (Peckham, 2003). In Lithuania identities are characterized as injured identities by specialists, because of the negative narratives of communism (Cepaitiene, 2001). This model is used in psychology (Gardiner and Mayerfeld Bell, 1998; Shotter and Billig, 1998).



**Figure 4.** The Narrative Identity Model.

The **Onion Model** (Figure 5) presupposes identities to contain a very inflexible and ossified core around which more casual identities can be wrapped up. Persons have core values that cannot be changed (Hopkins and Blackwood, 2011). So if you are born as a male person in Western Europe, much of your identity is already given and not subject to any change. It supposes identity processes to be a combination or interaction of cognitive and unconscious processes. Only the outer layers of the onion can be influenced to a certain extend. This model is used in anthropology.

In anthropological theory the ossified models of identity are related to an outdated essentialist understanding of culture (Grillo, 2003). This qualification




**Figure 5.** The Onion Model of Identity.

invoked new non-essentialist theories, based on processual theory in which identities are seen as constructed in a constant flux. The Onion Model takes an intermediate position because of its dynamic interaction between core and outer layers.

The ***Drifting Identity Model*** (Figure 6) draws on poststructuralist theory as it challenges the concept of identity as a stable 'self' with a single, discernible 'intent' (Derrida, 1966). Instead identities are supposed to develop through path dependency mechanisms, in which every previous change in identity invokes adjustment of identity to a new situation in a dualistic cognitive and unconscious process. It is based on a Foucauldian perspective on events in which nothing is taken for granted, but put in a historic perspective indicating its constitutive power relations. Identities in this perspective can only be understood as the sum of precedents in which a person or a group subjectifies itself by relating to agencies in their environment. The process as a whole is unmanageable and non-determinist for persons or groups themselves let alone for outsiders trying to steer identity construction in predefined directions.

These identity models can be used to compare different assumptions with respect to their vulnerability to branding and management and with respect to the production of cultural values in networks and communities. If one person can have different identities that relate to different social environments, he might have different or even contradicting values. If these



**Figure 6.** The Drifting Identity Model.

identities are considered as merely superficial, he can have fundamental or even unconscious emotional values that relate to the values he uses to make decisions. A concise overview of the relations between manageability, values and identity models is given in Table 3.

This comparison allows for a better understanding of identity claims on cultural heritage. Politicians tend to adhere to the manageable conceptions of identity, that relate to a single core image of society in which value consensus is deemed necessary to establish social cohesion (Parsons, 1951; Friedman, 1992). The Cartesian Radar Plot aligns with a territorial conception of culture and reflects the dominant conception of identities in discussions on Europeanization. This conception allows for regional branding which is the aim of many programmes and projects in Europe of the Regions. In scientific research the concepts based on pluralism and internal ossification are prevailing, see (Friedman, 1992; Howard, 2000). Although these concepts seem to give a better account for the cultural diversity that is encountered in the field of heritage, they are neglected by politicians. This is why identity competition is based on value monism in a single core society. In this competition there is no basic distinction between values and norms. If one departs from value pluralism then one needs norms to deal with this diversity: values and norms are un-exchangeable. Democracy in the value monism discourse is at the same time an intellectual heritage, the

**Table 3.** Simple comparison of identity models with respect to their assumptions regarding value consensus, manageability and its relationship to cultural heritage.

	Value monism	Value pluralism
Manageable by politicians	Cartesian radar plot, framing identity primarily as a rational process subdue to branding activities. Cultural heritage is used for branding the identity of a single core society.	Contextual model: influencing the context invokes identity adaptation. Cultural heritage is used to mark differences between communities.
Not manageable, because considered highly inflexible and ossified in its core.	Onion model, mostly already defined by kinship. Cultural heritage is used to penetrate in the core and represents the value consensus inherent in good citizenship.	
Not manageable, because considered primarily autonomous or undeterminable.		Narrative model: a set of individualized choices differently made in different situations, not free from emotions. Cultural heritage is used to produce and maintain the social memory and to clarify affiliations and uniqueness. Drifting model: path dependency in choices invoked by environmental changes, seemingly haphazardly taken without internal coherence.

key citizenship value and the norm to make any decision. The single core image of society inherent in this disposition causes the zero sum identity thinking so embarrassing for those who believe in cultural diversity as the most important characteristic of Europe.

## 2.4 Conclusions

There is disagreement on the relationship between cultural heritage and identity. For politicians this is a universalist one in which cultural heritage expresses their strive for social cohesion at EU, national or regional level. This striving leads to identity competition between these political levels. The very idea of European identity encompassing national identities and these again the regional ones seems attractive but fails to address the cultural pluralism that many see as characteristic for Europe.

Scientists advocate more pluralist and less manageable concepts of identity. These concepts seem better equipped for clarify pluralism in cultural heritage practices, but is abandoned by politicians. They are simply not appealing because of a lack of manageability and their inherent relationship with value pluralism in society. Value pluralism and cultural diversity are perceived as a potential danger for social cohesion.

The politics of identity construction uses cultural heritage to improve the social cohesion of their image of a society with a single core. Politicians of course position themselves in the middle of that core. Practice however shows that cultures can produce their identity rather independently from politics. These self made identities are highly positional and relational. A focus on achieving value consensus, embedded in an accepted form of European identity, is destined to fail because more complexity is needed in societal models, value pluralism and identity construction. The unmanageability and pluralist character of identity construction should be taken as a point of departure for European societal policies. Consequently, cultural heritage should be treated as expressions of cultural diversity, whereas citizenship should not be conceptualised on value consensus but on shared norms embedded in democracy.

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# Chapter 3.

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## The market of collective identities and legacy work<sup>5</sup>

*Itamar Even-Zohar*

Identity policy, the deliberate inculcation of a cluster of elements as inherently representative of a group, has been an indispensable procedure in group management since time immemorial.<sup>6</sup> Dominant forces have been using quite consistently this procedure to rule efficiently. When this policy is successful, optimally every single member of the group takes that cluster of elements as their personal property. The group would then reject, individually and collectively, attempts at eliminating elements from the cluster, whether initiated from within or from without. Being in possession of a collective identity has evidently been a primary condition not only for keeping a group together, but also for legitimizing its existence as a separate entity, which allows it privileges and distinction from other groups: '[...] the Egyptians might not eat bread with the Hebrews; for that is an abomination unto the Egyptians' (Genesis 43: 32; KJV version).

An illustration for such a collective commitment was recently provided by the controversy over the crucifix in school classrooms in Italy. A lawsuit was brought to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg by an Italian citizen of Finnish origin and others<sup>7</sup>, who maintained that:

...the presence of crucifixes in State-school classrooms in Italy, [...] [is] incompatible with the obligation on the State, in the exercise of the functions which it assumed in relation to education and to teaching, to respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in accordance with their own religious and philosophical convictions. (Press Release by the Registrar of the Court, no. 234, 18/03/2011).

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<sup>5</sup> I am grateful to Rakefet Sela-Sheffy for her invaluable suggestions and comments.

<sup>6</sup> For an extensive discussion of deliberate culture planning see Even-Zohar 2008.

<sup>7</sup> Lautsi and Others v. Italy (application no. 30814/06).



The court ruled against the plaintiffs, thus confirming that Christianity is an indispensable component of the European identity. Italy's foreign minister, Franco Frattini, is quoted to have said: 'Oggi ha vinto il sentimento popolare dell'Europa. Perché la decisione interpreta soprattutto la voce dei cittadini in difesa dei propri valori e della propria identità' (*Corriere della Sera*, 18/03/2011).<sup>8</sup> In the Vatican, reported *El Pais*, 'el presidente del Pontificio Consejo para la Cultura del Vaticano, el cardenal Gianfranco Ravasi, [...] ha recordado que "si Europa pierde la herencia cristiana" pierde también "su propio rostro"' (Miguel Mora, *El Pais*, 18/03/2011).<sup>9</sup> This crucifix controversy is probably only the tip of the iceberg in nowadays conflicts within the European Union countries over who owns the culture, namely who has got the right to tell whom what to do. Certainly, the reluctance to accept countries with predominantly non-Christian population has been a major cause for not accepting such a country as Turkey as a member.

Similarly, refusing secession for a group is also frequently based on the belief that the group seeking secession has no legitimate claim for a distinct identity. The slogan used by the Quebec separatists, 'Nous sommes différents', amply vociferated during the 1995 referendum campaign by Quebec's Premier Jacques Parizeau, was rejected by the Anglophone members of the confederation. In a meeting held on October 9, 1991, Parizeau said:

Eux [the Anglophones] ont défini leur pays (sur la Charte canadienne des droits, laquelle est devenue [...] le symbole de l'identité canadienne). Nous sommes en train d'en définir un autre. Cela ne nous rend pas moins démocrates pour autant. [...]. Cela nous rend différents (Parizeau, 1997: 237-238)<sup>10</sup>.

'Being different,' that is having a different culture, and consequently a different identity, has thus been the major argument for justifying the separation of Quebec, or any other group for that matter in history, ancient or modern.

It is thus evident that the endeavors invested in the making, incultation and declaration of a cluster of elements which constitute a group's identity

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<sup>8</sup> 'Today has won the popular sentiment of Europe; because the decision interprets above all the voice of the citizens in defense of their proper values and their proper identity.'

<sup>9</sup> 'The president of the Pontifical Council for Culture in the Vatican, Cardinal Gianfranco Ravasi, [...] has maintained that 'if Europe loses the Christian heritage' it'll also lose "its proper face".'

<sup>10</sup> 'They [the Anglophones] have defined their country (on the Canadian Charter of Rights [and Freedoms], which has become [...] the symbol of Canadian identity). We are in the course of defining another one. This does not make us less democratic as such. [...] This makes us different.'

has always had a double function: to achieve group cohesion as well as distinction on the basis of recognized assets.

Achieving group cohesion, and the creation of a sense of belonging, may entail demands for group loyalty and sacrifices from the group members. Without such individual dispositions, there can be no group agreements that are a fundamental condition for maintaining life among human beings. While in many periods in human history, such socially cementing elements have been created and diffused 'from below' by individuals or small groups, other times this kind of work was initiated and maintained 'from above', namely by rulers and leaders of groups. Ruling bodies do not necessarily cater for the interests of the population ruled by them, which in extreme cases may simply lead to cultural and political revolutions (that is, a drastic deliberate change of repertoire).

Evidently, whether in ancient Egypt or in modern Great Britain, beyond a certain level of discrepancies between the repertoire promoted by the population and the one imposed by dominant forces, the latter's tolerance can no longer be upheld. The ancient Egyptian state was engaged in a constant endeavor to harmonize the enormous variety of its population, as well as absorb the endless flux of migrants from all over the ancient world. In our own era, policies vary largely in different parts of the globe: some states, mostly totalitarian-ideological, would tolerate no such discrepancies, while other (Western democracies, for example) seem to allow certain latitude, even endorse 'multiculturalism'. However, outbursts of discontent take place even within those more liberal states. Recently, on February 2011, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, David Cameron, launched a fierce attack against what he considered to be an exaggerated tolerance towards what he believed to be unacceptable cultural repertoire. In his view, 'State multiculturalism is a wrong-headed doctrine that has had disastrous results. It has fostered difference between communities, and it has stopped us from strengthening our collective identity. Indeed, it has deliberately weakened it' (*The Guardian*, 6/2/2011).<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> *The Guardian's* editorial, however, strongly criticized Cameron: "David Cameron had an opportunity this weekend to say something interesting and relevant about a subject important to anyone who lives in Britain: how hyper-diverse societies can not only cohere, but thrive. He flunked it. What the prime minister offered instead was a mix of clichés, tired thinking and some downright offensive terminology (*The Guardian*, 7/2/2011).

The function of collective identity as an asset, both endogenously and exogenously, makes it a symbolic capital that allows for the group's status claims, namely justifying its existence as a separate entity (political or otherwise) and the exclusion of others. In his study 'Icelandic nationality identity: from nationalism to tourism,' Gísli Sigurðsson (Sigurðsson, 1996) shows how valorized goods (such as the old Icelandic manuscripts) are shown to official foreign visitors to reinforce Iceland's cause. It is symptomatic that even though Iceland declared its independence in 1944, it was only in 1971, when the agreement with Denmark on the return of the manuscripts was signed, it was 'the final confirmation that Iceland had gained its independence from Denmark' (Sigurðsson, 1996: 60-61).

The valuation of identities is thus part of the everlasting intergroup competition over prestige and status, which in the final analysis means competition over access to resources. An intergroup stock-exchange of such assets has been determinative since antiquity in hierarchizing the various ethnic and political groups vis-à-vis each other, allowing some to have more say than others. To win the competition, 'better elements' always had to be shown as pertinent to the claimant group, and therefore the repertoires of elements quickly crystallized to encompass a variety of components: from impressive buildings, like pyramids, city gates, hanging gardens and temples, to claims about freedom, quality of life and wealth, more powerful gods, better justice, personal security, and any possessions or principles that happened to be highly valued at a time. This basic repertoire was providing powerful tools for groups to exercise identity formation. It has not changed much since ancient Egypt with its pyramids (or chariots, horses and ornaments) and its *Ma'at* ('justice') concept (Assmann, 1989),<sup>12</sup> or since rulers of big and small states in the ancient Fertile Crescent boasted about the high quality of life for everyone within the territories they ruled (Green, 2003).<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> I am grateful to Orly Goldwasser for her personal communication on *Ma'at* as a factor of culture planning.

<sup>13</sup> Green summarizes the purpose of the boasting as follows: '[The boasted about] achievements cannot be divorced from the international competition for honor with friend and foe alike. Thus, they can be presented as the reversal of negative conditions--the destruction and desolation--created by the enemy. In this way, they are an extension of the king's victories over his enemies and so provide further evidence of his superiority over them. Domestic achievements were also used to demonstrate the king's superiority over other kings who were not regarded as enemies, e.g. fellow-vassals, and predecessors on the throne. They were also employed in a complex balance between the impulse to self-glorification and the recognition of the superiority of the king's suzerain.'

To enhance and facilitate the inculcation of identities, a variety of procedures has always been used, among which boasting about achievements in the form of rituals such as memorizing events and raising monuments have become to be the most popular.<sup>14</sup> A collective memory indispensably had to become part of the repertoire shared by the relevant group. 'Remember what Amalek did unto thee by the way, when ye were come forth out of Egypt' (Deuteronomy 25: 17; KJV), or the Passover Text (*Haggadah*) instruction 'and ye shall tell it to your son' (that is, the story of the exodus from Egypt) are two typical examples for memorizing rituals. No less symptomatic is the exhortation 'raccontiamone la storia ai nostri figli e ai nostri nipoti';<sup>15</sup> in an article entitled 'Ritroviamo l'orgoglio dell'Unità' ('let's recover the pride of the Unity,' Aldo Cazzullo, *Corriere della Sera*, 17/3/2011). These memories, stories told from one generation to the next, thus become common legacies, patrimony, an indispensable baggage to never be forgotten. Monuments, whether constructions or sites – stelae, sculptures, paintings, buildings, artifacts – work on the one hand to inscribe events and persons as part of the group's identity, and to display the splendor of the group's assets on the other. 'Legacy work' may thus refer to the two aspects of identity work, namely the creation of cohesion and the display of valuable goods.

Attempts at inculcating repertoires without some sort of persuasion hardly hold for more than a limited time, or do not hold at all. Violence, coercion, terror, and other non-peaceful methods of dictation cannot create the necessary consent among a group, and are therefore more costly to rulers, even if well-intended. In such cases as Peter the First's, the Czar of Russia, or Muhammad Tughluq's, the Sultan of Delhi, both aimed at reforming the repertoires of culture and the collective identity of their states. Tughluq has been far less successful than Peter the First, because he even failed to recruit the small group of adepts to support his reforms, as did Peter. Ibn Battuta has told the story of Tughluq's abortive projects, which were intended as innovations on a grand scale. The reluctance of the people to accept his decisions has not made him understand what others along history seem to have known from the outset, namely that mere coercion does not pay. Typically for him (as for similar dictators), the opposition to his decisions was taken by him as just 'une résistance ignorante et malveillante d'un peuple récalcitrant et mal disposé face à la justesse des actes d'un souverain éclairé. Cette vision des choses donne à ce dernier le droit d'imposer ses vues par la force et de punir les insoumis. Ainsi les plus grandes injustices

<sup>14</sup> For more about such procedures see During 2010.

<sup>15</sup> 'Let us tell the story [of the unification of Italy] to our children and grandchildren.'

et les plus grandes cruautés se feront au nom de l'ordre, de la justice et des grands principes de gouvernement' (Yerasimos, 1982)

There is a steady ebb and flow movement in respect to which aspect of the identity work, and the creation of legacies as part of it, dominates in different points of time. Roughly, it would seem justified to maintain that when a group is unstable, whether in a state of emergence or in crisis, identity work and the creation of legacies become major tools for securing its maintenance. In contrast, when a group has achieved a high level of cohesion, or when it is not threatened by adversaries, identity work may lose its intensity, and legacy work is mostly reduced to commodification of the objects and images (including stories and memories) that are part of the already recognized repertoire. It seems that at least in the cases of Greece and the Netherlands discussed by During (2010) this is actually the case. In contrast, in Lithuania 'the underlying resistance of the inhabitants of Kaunas against the military history of the town' (ibid.: 115) obliterated legacy plans devised by policymakers, and similarly in Crete, where 'Cretan people didn't like heritage, because it reminded them of periods in history in which they were not free' (ibid.: 137).

Thus, in established countries of the European Union, those which no longer have to legitimize their existence or justify the value of their legacies, legacy work is already often detached from identity work, serving the purpose of reinforcing the value of the assets on display for sale. When there is an abundance of objects and images, the state institutions involved with the promotion of legacies often mostly only work to facilitate the physical access to such assets (like places and monuments, books and manuscripts) or duly promote them via publications, visiting deals, or the Internet (Sigurðsson, 1996). On the other hand, for areas little known or which need some economic injection, legacy objects and images may be dug from some imaginary or covert sources. In short, it would be justified to contend that heritage has become mostly a matter of competition about 'who has got the better goods for sale,' while for the majority of people in everyday life they carry very little meaning.

However, this is not an unchanging matter. As the unanticipated outburst of the British prime minister quoted above shows, what seems to be a stable situation may quickly change once people in the group sends a threat to their established identity. When this occurs, indifference makes room for heated engagement; identity clashes may splash seemingly out of the blue

over some forgotten, or until that moment unimportant objects, images, or memories stored in some obfuscated cache.

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# Chapter 4.

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## Landscape's silenced stories

**Experiences of a foreign excursion as reflexivity practise for (students) education**

*Ralph Tangelder and Maaïke Andela*

### 4.1 Introduction

The importance of reflexivity in planning and design education (Schön, 1987; Howe and Langdon, 2002; Sletto, 2010; Varnelis, 2007) is only recently introduced in the current curriculum of the Landscape Architecture and Spatial Planning educational programme of Wageningen University. Students might not be fully aware of the importance of reflection, especially because it has been seen as normal that different opinions about good education co-exist. Also for the profession, opinions between and within universities may radically differ. Several views on the roles of planners and landscape architects exist. 'Opinions about what they do and what they are supposed to do differ' (Beunen *et al.*, forthcoming, p. 5) These opinions are liable to changing ideas in time. Being aware of these changing ideas should encourage students in starting to be reflective. 'A broadly conceived familiarity with politics, power, communication, interpretation and organization is needed' (Beunen *et al.*, forthcoming, p. 7). Students learn that the landscape itself, a common used 'object' throughout the educational curriculum, is a social construction. It is not something that simply exists; it is a visual image of cultural meanings based on different ways of seeing (Wylie 2007: 91). This is one of the most important lessons learned during the foreign excursion, as will be mentioned later. Students have to develop their own opinion regarding how they should deal with these cultural meanings in the educational and professional field of spatial planning and landscape architecture.





Identity design workshop in Wrocław.

## 4.2 Reflexivity in spatial planning and landscape architecture education

In the world of landscape architecture and spatial planning a belief in instrumental rationality, the possibility of steering and control, has always been very strong (Allmendinger, 2009; Scott, 1998; Flyvbjerg, 2002). However, influenced by the increase of a fragmented society, landscape dilemmas become more and more complex. Master plans are often outdated before being implemented. When the gap between the general society and the planning culture becomes too big, 'people become dissatisfied with the planning system, then the formerly assumed objective knowledge of the planners loses its perceived objectivity, becomes part of just one idea on the spatial organisation of the land, one idea amongst others' (Van Assche, 2004: 228). Understanding this 'opposition' versus top-down planning processes asks for different planning and design strategies and methods. Increasing attention towards the importance of the planning and design context is mentioned by Flyvbjerg (1998), Van Assche (2004), Duineveld (2006) and Beunen (2010). A reflexive approach on this planning and design world

in its context can be researched via new tools for planners and landscape architects. The basis for these tools is formed by paying attention to power and discourse analyses, cultural habits, history and memory, and conflict and justice. To be able to use these tools, planners and landscape architects have to accept their own changing role: instead of starting as an active participant in the planning and design process, using methods and tools to make 'good' plans, based on 'rational' criteria), they start as observers of the context in which the planning and design process will take place (Flyvbjerg, 1998, 2002). Phronetic planning research theory can assist in this type of research. This theory's value-rational questions (Flyvbjerg, 2004: 289) differ from the traditional questions based on a technical rational approach. Phronetic questions are about ethics, values and interests and consider the role of the planner himself as well. A very important aspect what should be included in this view is the aspect of power. 'Who wins?', 'Who loses?' and 'By which mechanisms of power?' are two of Flyvbjergs central questions for a phronetic planning research (Flyvbjerg, 2002: 356). Scientists act in this way, according to Fuchs (2001), as 'second-order' observers. They observe and reflect on thoughts, motivations and actions of first-order observers who deal with their object: the landscape and its spatial processes.

The shift in focus on the role of landscape architecture and spatial planning shows similarities and interesting interconnections with the 'Cultural turn' in geography (Wylie, 2007). As the cultural geographer Wylie argues: '... the landscape-text [...] is understood as being organised around questions of power and authority. In consequence, the task of the critical reader centres upon uncovering the hidden codes and meanings, and unquestioned assumptions, which in actuality structure how the text of landscape is read.' (Wylie, 2007: 71). We think spatial planners and landscape architects should take up the role of the 'critical reader'. This reflective approach will come at hand in unfamiliar circumstances, which differ from everyday situations, for example in different cultures and countries where competing stories of reality co-exist. According to Beunen *et al.*, (forthcoming, p. 5) different countries, even regions, have different planning and design traditions, different commonplace notions of the professions and their practitioners. The theoretical background described here, can be illustrated by experiences of the foreign excursion for landscape architecture and spatial planning students of Wageningen University, which took place in the summer of 2010.

### **4.3 Excursion experiences**

The foreign excursion, the so called Buitex, is organised by students of the study Landscape Architecture and Spatial Planning. This trip is one of the biggest events of the study association 'Genius Loci' each year and not part of the regular study program at Wageningen University. Students who join are participating voluntarily which often leads to a very motivated and interested group of students. In the year 2010, the theme of the excursion was based on a different approach as opposed to previous years. Whereas normally famous and world-leading cities and projects deemed relevant for landscape architecture and planning are being visited, this journey was based on a more critical-reflective focus. The main theme of the trip was: 'Crossing Borders!' and the destinations were several locations in eastern Germany, western Poland and the north of the Czech Republic.

The theme was not only about old and new borders, moving and fading borders; it also focussed very much on culture, cultural heritage, landscape and history along and within these borders. The region visited had a



Discussing world heritage in Dresden.

turbulent history of changing borders due to historical developments like the first and second world war, the Russian socialistic regime and 'Die Wende'. Every development left its own characteristics and the region tried its best to apply to these changes. History has influenced the landscape, culture and society of the people.

Students started to observe the landscape visited seen from their own, also by their education influenced, perspectives. Doing so however, seemed to be not satisfying in this region. The visual aspects of the current state of the landscape seemed to hide essential information, important for understanding this landscape. Uncertainties about how to get to know and understand this region started to occur. Questions like, 'Is what we see really the history of the region?' rose. A different approach for understanding the identity and situation of this region was needed here; students were forced to act as second order observers. Students started to have a look from different viewpoints, to create a better understanding about what was going on in the region. Questions like 'What is cultural heritage and for whom, in whose eyes and during which period in time?' came up. A concrete example during the trip, which stimulated thoughts about these questions, was the visit to the ex-UNESCO Elbe bridge in Dresden. 'Why did the UNESCO delete the Elbe valley from the list? What makes that suddenly heritage is not heritage anymore? Does heritage only exist when it is noted as being heritage?' Also the visit to the post-mining area in Lusatia (near Cottbus, eastern Germany) stimulated this. 'Can such an industrial area become cultural heritage? Which aspects can be and which aspects not? Why is that?' There was no clear and simple answer to these questions. The three countries visited also had their own attitude towards the concept of heritage; people dealt with this aspect in different ways. Examples like the cross-border Fürst-Pückler park in Bad Muskau (Germany-Poland) and the city of Görlitz/Zgorzelec (Germany-Poland) show the different ways of maintenance of buildings, parks and public space. Where in the German part of the Fürst-Pückler park the space was maintained very much into detail, the Polish side was more left to the natural developments. Also the communication between both parts of the park was not perfect as students discovered by talking to a guide. Big border differences were visible in the city of Görlitz/Zgorzelec. The German part was well maintained, especially on the side facing the Polish border. In contrast the Polish part showed not that well maintained buildings and public space. A visit to the Książ Castle (Poland) summarised a lot of other questions the students had during the trip, just in one situation. Questions like: 'Who decides what cultural heritage is and what is shown to

inhabitants and public?' (who has the power to decide this?), 'Which identity do you want to take from the past?', 'What are borders and how are borders constructed?' and 'What are the visible and non-visible influencing aspects of borders on the people who live next to them?' rose here. Students concluded that borders between countries, identities and groups of people are not given and essentialist entities but constructed by people. Also they realised that borders change over time.

## **4.4 Learning moments**

Almost none of the students were familiar with the background of the places visited. For understanding this new place, students had to observe open-minded; without prejudices or with explicit prejudices. This attitude turned out to increase the 'level of discoveries' regarding silenced stories, politics and identity. It turned out that the prejudices about the places visited were built upon social constructions of reality. In this way the students also learned about themselves. They have, like every person, prejudices regarding certain places. Adjusting people's own prejudices really helps their own learning process about the way people construct their own realities, their ways of seeing. By asking local inhabitants (from several ethnic backgrounds) living in the area, experts and the teachers to answer the questions, it was noticed that they all have their own opinion and viewpoint towards reality as well. Critical questions and listening to people telling their own story about the area and the things that happened there during history gave important information, showing competing stories. Some were advocated, others marginalised. It was necessary for the students to discuss and evaluate this information afterwards in order to develop an own opinion and understanding about the situation. It showed the students the importance of reflexivity.

Pronetic research was carried out by the students, by asking inhabitants and guides critical questions, reading information in detail and trying to get to know the changes in history very thoroughly. Students were not told how they should carry out assignments, but more how events happened in a certain context and how spatial planners and landscape architects could be aware of this and make use of the information in order to develop an own opinion. Students learned that there is not one right/true/false story about an area and that nothing can be kept under total control. Also it showed that planning and design always involves decision making were some loose other





Nazi remnants in German heritage situated in Poland.

win (Flyvbjerg, 2002). Discussing about the experiences and different views towards situations and reflecting on this individually but also in the group was essential to formulate conclusions. The observed landscape is the result of choices people made in the past. In this way a troubled past also can cause conflicts in the present day. Negative stories are often hidden or deleted from the landscape. Students realised that it was important to be critical and conduct research on the stories which are not visible anymore in the physical landscape. The trip also made the students aware of their own frame-work in which they were used to operate. 'Being aware of this framework also makes us aware of the framework of others' (Student's quote). This fits quite well to what Beunen *et al.* explain about what students should learn in their studies. 'Students learn to analyze landscape and planning and design practices, to study spatial developments, to comprehend differing spatial claims, and to generate alternative solutions for example. Reflect on these practices as well as on their potential roles and contributions' (Beunen *et al.*, forthcoming, p. 5 and 6). Acting as a second-order observer, asking critical questions about the local situation and (historical) context, was necessary for a better understanding of the area.



Observing new construction works in Dresden.

## 4.5 Conclusion

Based on the remarks and observations of students who participated during the above described foreign excursion, we may firstly conclude that obtaining a reflective attitude should be an important aspect in planning and design educational programmes. Secondly we want to stress the importance of learning-by-doing. In this line Beunen *et al.* remarks that the real use of educational theory for practitioners ‘partly implies that we need to train their (students) reflective skills by means of assignments on real life situations, the social and political context in which they are ought to work.’ (Beunen *et al.*, forthcoming, p. 11) Only when students are confronted with practical situations outside the academic world the added value of reflection kicks in. Landscape’s ‘silenced stories’ become visible. Students start to question their own attitude and role in the planning and design process. They start to become more realistic. The foreign excursion mentioned above is a method to make students more aware of the importance of being reflexive. In this way, future professionals are more aware of the limitations and possibilities of their role as landscape architects and spatial planners.

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# Chapter 5.

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## **Settlers, environmentalism and identity: Western Galilee 1949-1965**

### **Report on a pilot study**

*Rakefet Sela-Sheffy*

### **5.1 Introduction**

#### **5.1.1 Identity work from below**

While top down policies are important for the formation of collective identities, they are not always as overpowering as they are sometimes believe to be, as emerges, for instance, from the bulk of studies on national propaganda and education. Their effectiveness inevitably depends on the way they are received, if at all, in specific social settings. With this in mind, my project aims to examine *grassroots processes* of identity formation, as developed in a specific local context – the Israeli-Jewish society in Western Galilee during early Israeli Statehood. In line with constructionist approaches, I take identity to mean the concrete performance of ‘the kind of a person I am and where I belong’ (Goffman, 1959), which is produced by individuals as members of groups, according to resources available to them in everyday contexts (Swidler, 1986) – be it a family, an occupation, a locality, etc. Participating in an *environmental movement* can also serve such a site for identity work (e.g. Kitchell *et al.*, 2000). While macro-level environmental discourses have been profoundly studied, it is only recently that studying environmental *identities* in this micro-scale sense is beginning to take shape. From this perspective, I find the history of the Israeli environmental movement a very interesting case, precisely because of its co-occurrence with Israeli nationalism and state formation processes.

### 5.1.2 Israeli proto-environmentalism – a brief historical overview

While in the USA and Europe environmental movements originated already back in the 19th and early 20th centuries, in Israel (and formerly British-ruled Palestine) this process was belated. By and large, it depended on a belated modernization process, which was introduced to this territory by two central forces: the Hebrew national culture-building project, which transformed the local social space ever since the late 19th century; and the British Mandate, which ruled Palestine between 1918 and 1948. Before British times, awareness of and sentiments for the Nature and the Land, as conceptualized today by Western cultures, are believed to have been alien to both Jewish and Arab traditional communities. Descriptions of Palestine in late 19th century under Ottoman rule report unrestricted exploitation of natural resources by excessive grazing, wood cutting, fires and hunting (Figure 1 and 2). The British Mandate initiated nature protecting regulations, yet it had little impact on the local communities. As for the emerging modern Hebrew culture, it was inherently ambivalent with regard to this matter: on the one hand, influenced by European Modernism, it embraced the idea that intimate experience with the natural environment was indispensable for the formation of a 'healthy Native Hebrew Person'. On the other hand, it is believed that the very idea of nature *conservation* conflicted with the national mission of 'conquering the wilderness' (e.g. De-Shalit, 1985).



**Figure 1.** Kibbutz Hanita early settlement 1938 (the Wall and Tower operation); still under severe grazing and wood cutting.



**Figure 2.** The old tower of Kibbutz Hanita, 1990s, after forestation and nature protecting actions.

Nevertheless, as early as the 1900s, a dozen of young Jewish zoologists and botanists began to study systematically the flora and fauna of geographical Palestine<sup>16</sup>. As European-oriented scholars, they formed an elitist circle of professionals; at the same time, as ideologically driven Zionists, they also claimed a role in the Hebrew cultural revival. Consequently, in the Hebrew teacher-seminaries biology and geography (*'Erdkunde'*) became major fields of study. During the 1920s and 1930s there emerged clubs of *Nature Lovers* and *Wandering Teachers*, endorsed by the leading Zionist bodies; In 1931, a Hebrew periodical for *Nature and the Land* was founded, and in 1953 the *Society for the Protection of Nature in Israel* (SPNI) – the first nationwide green body in Israel – was officially founded by a group of 70 devotees, who were joined by several thousands of members over the next few years (Alon, 1959). However, it was not before the mid- 1960s, with the foundation of the

<sup>16</sup> Before the British Mandate 'Palestine' never constituted a political or administrative unit. Under the Ottoman Empire Ottoman this territory was taken to loosely encompass parts of nowadays Lebanon, Syria, Israel, and Jordan.

*Israel Nature and National Parks Authority* that all this hitherto predominantly voluntary-based activity evolved into an economic and legal apparatus.

Consequently, although seminal attempts to write a history of the Israeli environmental movement have concentrated largely on organizations and legislation on the national level, they all agree that these processes were massively propelled from below (Tal, 2002). While the *SPNI* was originated by a group of professionals, it actually started as an avant-garde popular movement based on local networks in peripheral areas, about whom we still know very little.

### **5.1.3 Grassroots processes**

The notion of grassroots is most often used in the context of anti-establishment spontaneous actions (e.g. Cable and Benson, 1993; Kousis *et al.*, 2008). However, not always is local action geared to a pointedly political agenda; often, in fact, it reveals interdependencies with centralized forces and enjoys cooperation of the authorities (Rootes, 2007). The *SPNI* is a typical case in point. While its early activists were often seen as eccentric (sometime even anarchist), their action was actually imbued with 'banal nationalism' (Billig, 1985), the *doxa* of the Hebrew-Israeli society at the time. This complexity in conceiving of social movements is addressed by the *culture*-approach (e.g. Poletta, 2008; Swidler, 1995) which moves away from seeing these movements as rationally organized groups fighting for well-defined political goals. Instead, it takes them in a broader sense, to be *social spaces* within which cultural repertoire is learned and maintained. In line with practice theories, notably that of Pierre Bourdieu, environmental sociologists (e.g. Crossley, 2003; Haluza-DeLay, 2008) talk about an environmental *habitus* – in the sense of a complex of cultural dispositions and practice models that are acquired and performed in a given time and space. In this light, my project focuses on the *experience of the participants* in their own natural habitat: their motivation to act, their sentiments and aspirations, and the social role they assumed in their communities.

### **5.1.4 The regional setting – peripherality**

Western Galilee (stretching along the northern coastal plain of Israel, 19 km from Acre to Rosh-HaNiqra on the Lebanese border, and around 25 km eastwards up to the mountain range; Figure 3 and 4) was one of the areas where Nature protection activism burgeoned most rapidly during early



**Figures 3.** Map of Israel.



**Figure 4.** Map of Western Galilee.



statehood, and one of the pioneering centers of the SPNI activity from its very initiation. The reason for this accelerated process was, I believe, the extreme socio-geographical *peripherality* of this region. From the viewpoint of the Jewish society in Palestine before Israeli statehood (1948), it was a remote frontier, inhabited sparsely by Arab, Druze and Bedouins living on traditional farming and grazing, with even sparser Jewish settlements between 1934 and 1949. The latter were modern agricultural communities (mainly *Kibbutzim*) founded by young newcomers from Central and Eastern Europe or natives of Palestine, who arrived in the region in groups supported by the Jewish settlement bodies. As a result of the 1947-1949 Israeli-Arab war and the formation of the Israeli state (1948), this region underwent rapid transformation, with Arab communities on the coastal plain largely gone, and with the intensification of Jewish communities, mainly *Kibbutzim*, but also semi-urban communities of newcomers from the Near East and North Africa, together with some industry and tourism along the coast (Sofer and Yedaaya, 1975). It was this growing community of Jewish-Hebrew '*veteran settlers*' who then became the social elite of this region; it was also they who became the chief proponents of environmental action in this area.

## 5.2 Preliminary hypotheses

So far I have interviewed 7 key informants, inhabitants of the region, between 70 to over 90 years old, and started to trace whatever archival material that could be found, identifying a core group of 20-25 old-time participants, and their broader milieu. Naturally I do not rely on their retrospective testimonies for accurate reconstruction of historical events. To the contrary, I take their personal narratives to be *mythologies of selves and the collective* (e.g. Andrews *et al.*, 2006). On the basis of these preliminary findings I suggest the following points for further consideration:

### 5.2.1 Environmental habitus as a resource

My interviewees reveal that appropriating a nature loving ethos and environmental practices provided them with a sense of empowerment and social distinction (to use Bourdieu's terminology). Moreover, the vigor of nature loving as an *avant-garde disposition* lied, in their eyes, precisely in that it endowed these activists with distinction vis-à-vis their own communities, often at the risk of being condemned as the 'enemies of the people'.

### Vignette 1

Joseph grew up in one of the pioneer *Kibbutzim* in this region, which farms fish ponds. The ponds attract many water birds; shooting the birds was very common at the time. As a teenager in the 1940s Joseph used to help the hunters collecting the shot birds. Later, however, after having graduated from the *Kibbutzim* teacher seminary, which was known as an incubator of Nature lovers, he openly opposed the bird shooters. In his interview he emphasizes that he had gone very far with his conviction even at the cost of fighting his own peers. At first, he tried to convince them not to hunt, using his artillery of professional and moral rhetoric: 'I'd tell them look... these birds *come to us for the winter* and ... this is an *educational asset* [...] an *aesthetic experience* for travelers coming to this area... don't hunt, *you are not so poor that you need this duck for food* [...]' (lines 237-239; emphases added).<sup>17</sup> As he gradually became involved with the *SPNI*, however, he started to report the shooters. He accentuates that he would report 'even members of our *Kibbutz* [...]' then they came complaining that I was an informer... they accused me of being disloyal, that I gave away my own people [...]' [lines 242-243].

## 5.2.2 Social networks as generators of environmental habitus

Where did these young people acquire this disposition? Originally, many of them were already equipped with a modern, romantic, anti-urban pantheism acquired through their secular education at elementary schools or agricultural boarding schools, youth movements, or the Hebrew teacher seminaries, all of which were elite institutions in pre-State times. The practice of hiking and trekking was particularly endorsed by these educational channels. As a social ritual it was not necessarily connected with nature protection; in fact, it was often associated with anti-protection activities, such as collecting plants or even hunting. But the knowledge and habits of getting acquainted with Nature were already there.

Yet how was this disposition maintained in the local arena? Two interdependent social networks in particular seem to have been responsible for it:

1. In 1952, a ***Regional Geographical Circle***, the first of its kind in the country, was founded by members of the local *kibbutzim* in the region. They were around a hundred nature freaks and devoted hikers, including biology teachers and academics, and amateur archeologists, whose interest lied in exploring the region's natural phenomena and ancient sites. Although this

<sup>17</sup> All translations are mine.



was a volunteer association, it nevertheless initiated serious campaigns such as zoological, botanical, geological and archeological surveys and mapping projects, the findings of which were subsequently published in a special series they established (e.g. Yedaaya and Gil, 1961), which often enjoyed the recognition of university scholars. The Circle also organized conventions and trips, created nature collections and exhibitions, and launched the project of marking paths.

2. This highly active group, dispersed throughout the region, served the pool of volunteers who participated in the earliest ***SPNI Nature protection campaigns***. At this early phase, there was actually no clear-cut distinction between the *SPNI* action and that of the Regional Circle. Igal, one of the founders of the regional Circle, was also the first *NPNI* employee in the country. Recruited in 1956, he later mobilized his friends – as volunteers or part-time workers – to help in the various campaigns he initiated with the *SPNI*. The *SPNI* thus relied on these local agents for information and services. In this way, most of the campaigns were actually *locally based* and emerged *from the community*, and thus not really conflicting with its needs.

#### *Vignette 2*

In the 1950s, the increased population of boars in the Galilee was declared a severe threat to agricultural plantations. The ministry of agriculture fought the boars with pesticides. However, *as the locals observed*, while the number of boars was not reduced, poisoning was devastating to other wild animals and birds. A survey was then launched between 1957 and 1962 by the local *SPNI* agent 'together with people of the settlements' (Sela, 1963: 238); they worked 'under the assumption that if there is no way to improve the efficacy of the poison, or find a replacement for it, there is no reason to jeopardize in vain the large population of birds and wild as well as domestic animals – which are being poisoned directly or indirectly' (ibid).

Another example is the central role of the Regional Circle in initiating cave research in Israel:

#### *Vignette 3*

In 1952, Igal discovered a stalactite cave while wandering in a local *Wadi* (*Wadi al-Dilb*; now *Nahal Namer*). The news spread, and the cave attracted thousands of visitors. 'I am sad to report', he writes, 'that these visitors left behind them cans, bottles, soot on the walls, and even worse; most of the small stalactites were demolished' (Sela, 1959: 41). Members of the Regional

Circle tried to fight these phenomena. In 1955 they gathered dozens of local school children in the *Wadi* to mark paths to the cave so as to control access to it. With the support of the Regional Council a lock was installed on the cave. But because of road constructions in the area it was left broken, and preventing the destruction of the stalactites was impossible. Nevertheless, a trend of cave searching developed rapidly throughout the following decade by local, highly motivated adventurers, who managed to mobilize the Post & Telephones services as well as the army for technical support (such as hug ladders for climbing to inaccessible spots, or cables for sliding down cave pits). This trend yielded the discovery and mapping of 35 caves throughout the Galilee, the documentation of which was handed over to the Hebrew University and became the basis for an academic cave research in Israel.

### 5.2.3 Activists' self role-images

Finally, what were the personal motivation and forms of self-gratification invested by these settlers in their environmental action? As my pilot interviews suggest, they all treated this activity as a *vocation*, one that met their internal drive and grew organically in the course of their lives, and at the same time also involved social responsibility and leadership. Accordingly, they wavered between three main role-images which they have embraced so as to make sense of their action and build their authority as agents of cultural change. Let me briefly mention these role-images:

1. *The educator*. One way or another all my interviewees saw themselves as educators in the sense that they were dealing with changing conceptions and habits within their community. 'I persuaded the nursery teachers' Joseph says, 'that daffodils are beautiful when they grew in the field. Go with the children, enjoy, and go home, do not pick [the flowers]... [I was doing this] even before the SPNI started its campaign [for protecting wild flowers]' (lines 272-274). As mentioned, some of them were actually teachers by their profession; those who worked with the SPNI served as teacher-guides and later as supervisors in the Nature Reserves. Regardless of their official title, however, they all portray themselves as *total educators* who combine science and humanities, devoting countless extra hours to their mission.
2. *The professional researcher*. All my interviewees were also mindful of acquiring a highly professional-scientists profile. In their interviews, they exhibit profound knowledge in botany, zoology, geology, climatology or archeology, often using scientific jargon. For instance, here is how Michael, (who died in 2010 at the age of 95), tells about a colleague, who

'[...] published his findings, with a picture of [...] the Blue Water Lily – *Nymphaea caerulea*, as it is called in Latin [...] According to Linné, [...]' (lines 288-293). They had connections with academic researchers, who in turn acknowledged these local agents' expertness and consulted with them in their studies. Michael, narrating his joining a research expedition for sea turtle hatching in the area, is also very aware of acknowledging the discoverer of a phenomenon he is describing, as a token of a professional ethics:

[one day in 1952] I got a message from [Prof Heinrich] Mendelssohn: 'Michael [...] we are going to *Akhziv* [...] you'll see there a very interesting natural phenomenon, (-) sea turtles.' (-) Well I waited for Mendelssohn, and also for Prof. [Alexander] Barash [...] <sup>18</sup> and we drove to *Akhziv*... and there Igal waited for us [...] we saw the whole process [of hatching] and it was impressive! It is extraordinary. But Igal is [actually] the one who discovered [the whole thing] [...] (lines 115-130).

3. *The authentic Nature freak and hiker*: this is the most stereotypical image usually attributed to the earlier generation of SPNI members. They are usually mythologized as non-conformist, unaffected, risk taking adventurers with unrestrained love for nature and the land. Etan, a local *kibbutz* member, exhibits this disposition to the fullest. For instance, this is how he recounts his first arrival to the region in 1948, at the age of 15:

[My fiend and I] heard [...] that... a leopard was caught in Western Galilee, in a *Wadi* [...] so we both took backpacks and [...] came [to the region] with backpacks and sleeping bags and soup powders. [...] We wandered four days [...] in the *Wadi*. [...] We used to wander alone throughout the country, without problems (lines 94-127).

He clarifies that being a hiker was his natural disposition, independently of any official constraints: '[...] I used to hike... don't belong to any body... the SPNI did not yet exist [when I started]' (line 34). He is therefore quite critical of institutionalized environmentalism and makes a point of dissociating himself from mainstream organizations, including the SPNI: '[...] we started building [...] the field school [in *Akhziv*]... [I was involved] not as a regular member, [but rather] only... when I was needed. [...]' (lines 572-576); 'soon enough [...] I no longer liked it [...] it no longer suited me [...]' (lines 726-727). Consequently, he claims an inherent authentic understanding of nature, to

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<sup>18</sup> Both Prof. Mendelssohn and Prof. Barash were among the founders of the Zoological Institute in Tel Aviv, later to become the basis for the Biology Department at Tel Aviv University upon its foundation (1953).

the point of despising the recent trendy scientific-like environmentalism, which he calls a 'panic of Nature protection': 'I said we need to protect Nature but [also] to remain normal [...] it was a kind of transformation from [no awareness at all] to Nature protection orthodoxy [...]' (lines 736-742).

### 5.3 Conclusion

There is a seeming paradox in the fact that these proto-environmentalism emerged from within agricultural communities, the forerunners of the Hebrew settlement movement in this region, whose practical interests obviously conflicted with nature preservation. These people's earlier environmental actions were not about defending their interests, such as public health or social justice, but rather about *Nature Protection* as such. Why was it important to them? Given the hardships of their life as settlers in a remote periphery, this concern would have appeared as eccentric – as indeed it was often seen. The reason for it must therefore have been *cultural*. Beyond material conditions, I suggest that this was a matter of *identity struggle in the face of a changing socio-demographic surrounding*. These secular Jewish settlers were new in the region and novice in agricultural work. Even if many of them were natives of Palestine, they still had to get better acquainted with the place and get used to rural life. In making this region their home, they had the ambivalent position of competing with both *old-time* Arab and Druze communities, on the one hand, and *newly-arrived* Jewish communities, on the other. I suggest that the Modern repertoire of Nature Loving attitudes and practices, which were alien to the local traditional communities of both non-Jewish natives and Jewish newcomers, served them as a distinguishing resource for claiming status as locals. Given that the non-Jewish population was by then severely disempowered, this identity contest seems to have been first and foremost an internal dynamics within the *Jewish* society.

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# Chapter 6.

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## **Symposium on cultural heritage and identity politics**

**11 October 2011**

*Rosalie van Dam*

Cultural Heritage and Identity Politics was the focus of the second Ibn Battuta symposium. The symposium addressed the various ways in which identity and the politics of identity and the production and signification of cultural heritage are entangled.

Roel During discussed identity politics in European heritage discourses. He started his presentation with the question: Dutch heritage, World heritage it seems so familiar to us, but what is European heritage? Can a windmill be both Dutch and European heritage? According to the Venice Charter governments have the obligation to take care of cultural heritage, the Faro convention focuses more on the value of cultural heritage for society. The Faro definition of cultural heritage claims its value as memory, identification and creativity. Cultural heritage and identity discourses coincide in the discussions on European citizenship, cross cultural understanding, economic specialization and tourism development. Roel During developed five models concerning the relation heritage and identity: (1) an Cartesian model suitable for regional branding; (2) a Narrative model suitable for achieving value consensus; (3) a Contextual model suitable for intercultural learning and stability; (4) an Onion model suitable for nesting identities; and (5) a Drifting model in which identities are constructed and reconstructed by internalising certain events. In the end also the issue of zero sum identity (more European identity necessarily implies less national identity and more regional identity implies less national identity) and the absence of a pluralist view on European society was addressed.

Itamar Even-Zohar, Professor Emeritus of Culture Research of Tel Aviv University spoke about the Identity dynamics between market and institutions. In his view identity work, is only partly overlapping with heritage work. According to him there is a decline of identity politics. Whereas in earlier days the making of identity was an indispensable in the making of a nation state (for example forming Italy out of many regions), nowadays many nation states are no longer dominant identity/image makers. Citizens accept power willingly because they already have the identity (for example being Italian). According to Mr. Even-Zohar heritage work is highly commodified and doesn't function for who it is designed. Heritage in his view is mostly a competition about 'who has the better goods' (in relation to tourism) than that is it about the signification for the life of people.

Then, Buitex Students Maaïke Andela and Ralph Tagelder shared their experiences concerning crossing borders. 'The Buitex' is a commission of the study association Genius Loci of the study Landscape architecture and Spatial Planning (Wageningen University). In the summer of 2010 they organised a trip with the main theme: 'Crossing borders'. The study area was the area around Dresden (Germany) and Wrocław (Poland). This region surprised the students with their turbulent history, great (landscape-)architecture, beautiful nature and most of all by the hidden stories between people and their landscape.

Ms. Rakefet Sela-Sheffy, Associate Professor at the Unit of Culture Research, Faculty of Humanities, Tel Aviv University, took us to the world of settlers, environmentalism and identity. Her main fields are identity and group-status, talk and self-representations, canon formation, cultural models, popular culture, cultural contacts, translation, pre-State and contemporary Israeli culture. She talked about a project concerning Israeli proto-environmentalism, grassroot processes and initiatives in Western Galilee in 1949-1965. The pilotstudy shows that the modern repertoire of nature loving attitudes and practices which were alien to the traditional communities served them as an exclusive resource for claiming status as locals (avant-garde). Moreover, the activists' had a sense of vacation which grew organically in the course of their lives.

## About the authors

**Maaike van Andela** is student at WUR and member of the Buitex Commission. 'The Buitex' is a commission of the study association Genius Loci of the study Landscape architecture and Spatial Planning (Wageningen University). In the summer of 2010 they organised a trip with the main theme: 'Crossing borders'. The study area was the area around Dresden (Germany) and Wrocław (Poland). This region surprised the students in their turbulent history, great (landscape-)architecture, beautiful nature and most of all by the hidden stories between people and their landscape.

**Rosalie van Dam** works at Alterra Wageningen UR as a researcher on various topics of the civil society. She is doing a PhD research on social and spatial bonding processes of self organising communities and its implications for governance.

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**Roel During** works at Alterra Wageningen UR as senior researcher on cultural heritage and spatial planning. In his PhD research he investigated the ideological, strategic and territorial claims on cultural heritage in the discourse of the Europe of the Regions.

<http://www.lup.wur.nl/UK/Staff/during/>.

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[http://www.tau.ac.il/~itamarez/ez\\_vita/ez-eng.htm](http://www.tau.ac.il/~itamarez/ez_vita/ez-eng.htm).



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Cultural heritage seems like apple cake: who is against it? Sometimes it looks like a topic lacking political discussions. Scientists and cultural heritage experts produce knowledge on historic values and objective criteria and claim everything to be under control. If the right procedures are deployed, tourists, residents, everyone! benefits. However, reality is different. When focusing on identity discussions, politicians are very influential on the selection and signification of cultural heritage. The production of cultural heritage takes place at the fringe of remembering and social forgetting of a society. What should be remembered and what ought to be forgotten however is a key issue in politics. Political claims on societal progress involve picturing a selection of the past and its manifestations as outdated, sometimes designated as cultural heritage. This discourse on societal progress reproduces images of the roots and characteristics of a society: the issue of identity. As such and in various other ways the politics of identity plays an important role in the production and signification of cultural heritage. This symposium on cultural heritage and identity politics focuses on revealing these ways and discussing their implications.

ISBN 978-94-6173-075-6



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